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Opening the Rule 10b-5 Floodgates:
Ninth Circuit Split in Gilead Sciences Leaves the
Loss Causation Pleading Standard in Limbo
I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation,1 the
Ninth Circuit allowed a class action securities fraud complaint to
proceed beyond Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without any factual basis to
demonstrate proximate causation, or more specifically, that plaintiffs’
losses were caused by the alleged fraud rather than other
confounding factors. The court also approved plaintiffs’ causation
theory alleging that an “efficient” securities market took three
months to incorporate a public fraud disclosure into share prices of
the defendant corporation, Gilead Sciences. The standards to which
the court held plaintiffs’ complaint run contrary, however, to the
prevailing loss causation pleading standards among circuit courts,
and cut at the policies underlying private securities litigation.
Although pre-discovery pleading standards are not traditionally
fraught with heavy evidentiary burdens, Congress and the Supreme
Court have imposed heightened pleading requirements for securities
suits to cut back on frivolous litigation. The Ninth Circuit threatens
to undermine these procedural safeguards by introducing a highly
permissive loss causation standard that fails to sift meritorious claims
from implausible or highly speculative in terrorem securities fraud
suits.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Circumstances Precipitating Litigation
A group of investors who purchased stock in Gilead Sciences,
Inc. (“Gilead”) between July 14, 2003, and October 28, 2003,
brought a class action securities fraud suit against Gilead on
December 2, 2005.2 The plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint

1. 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1993 (2009).
2. Id. at 1050; In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May
12, 2006).
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alleges that Gilead violated, inter alia, section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 by misleading the
investing public to believe that demand for its most popular product
was strong without disclosing that unlawful marketing was a
significant cause of new sales growth.3
Gilead is a biopharmaceutical company that specializes in
developing and commercializing medications to treat life-threatening
diseases.4 The company’s most successful product is Viread, an
antiretroviral medication introduced in 2001 to treat HIV/AIDS.5
Viread was so successful that Gilead raised the product’s price in
June of 2003.6 On July 14, 2003, the first day of the class period,
Gilead issued a press release announcing that its second quarter
financial results would exceed expectations, driven primarily by the
“strong sales growth of Viread.”7 The release explained that Viread
sales increased due to “broader prescribing patterns . . . as well as
increases in U.S. wholesaler inventory.”8 Two weeks later, on July
31, 2003, Gilead issued another press release disclosing second
quarter revenues of $230.7 million, more than half of which related
to Viread sales.9 The same day, an officer of Gilead explained to
analysts and other investors that Viread sales would likely fall in the
third quarter because wholesalers amassed substantial stockpiles of
Viread in anticipation of the product’s June price increase.10
Notwithstanding this caveat, market analysts—including Morgan
Stanley, Prudential, and Bear Stearns—continued to predict strong
demand for Viread.11
Plaintiffs allege that Viread’s strong sales performance was driven
by illegal “off-label” marketing, which refers to the use of marketing
information such as clinical study results on the efficacy of an FDAapproved product that have not been approved by the FDA for
inclusion in the product’s package labeling.12 Gilead’s off-label

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1050–51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1051–52.
Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008).
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marketing allegedly took three forms: “1) marketing to HIV patients
co-infected with Hepatitis B; 2) marketing Viread as a first-line or
initial therapy for HIV infection; and 3) marketing against Viread’s
safety profile.”13 The company began training sales and marketing
employees as early as 2001 with off-label product information, and
implicitly or explicitly encouraged them to use the information to
sell Viread through and subsequent to the class period.14 Two
confidential witnesses also allege that as much as 85% to 95% of their
own Viread sales were the result of off-label marketing.15
Gilead’s off-label marketing did not go unnoticed by the FDA.
On March 14, 2002, the FDA sent an “Untitled Letter” ordering
Gilead to cease marketing activities that understate the risk of
Viread.16 Gilead agreed to cease all off-label marketing activity, but
the FDA followed up a year later on July 29, 2003, with a “Warning
Letter” 17 (“FDA Warning Letter”) chastising the company for “oral
statements that minimized the risk information and broadened the
indication for Viread.”18 Notwithstanding the FDA’s public release
of the Warning Letter on August 7, 2003, Gilead shares closed at
higher prices on both August 7 and August 8.19
Although wholesalers and doctors allegedly understood the
significance of the FDA Warning Letter—purportedly indicated by
declining Viread sales during the third quarter of 200320—plaintiffs

13. Id.; Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *2.
14. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1051.
15. Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *3 n.4. Plaintiffs allege that between $86.7 and
$109.82 million of Viread’s $115.6 million in sales during the second quarter of 2003 was
attributable to off-label marketing. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1052 n.4.
16. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1051.
17. Gilead Sciences, Inc., FDA Warning Letter, MACMIS No. 11723 (July 29, 2003),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPha
rmaceuticalCompanies/UCM168912.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
18. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1052–53.
19. Id. at 1053.
20. Id. at 1054 (explaining plaintiffs’ theory that disappointing third quarter Viread sales
were attributable to “lower end-user demand” caused by the FDA Warning Letter). Contra
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–14, Gilead Sciences., Inc. v. St. Clare, 129 S. Ct. 1993
(2009) (No. 08-1021), 2009 WL 355727 (explaining that Viread end-user demand actually
grew by up to 17% during the third quarter). Market analysts—including Morgan Stanley and
Bear Stearns—attributed Viread’s overall sales decline to excessive wholesaler inventory
stockpiling during the second quarter, indicating that second quarter “end-user demand run
rates were actually lower than previously believed. Thus, while Viread demand continue[d] to
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allege that the market failed to comprehend the implications of
Gilead’s off-label marketing activity.21 In addition, although Gilead
acknowledged the FDA Warning Letter in its August 14, 2003,
second quarter 10-Q filing,22 plaintiffs argue that Gilead’s failure to
discuss the activities giving rise to the letter and the impact the letter
would have on Viread sales amounted to a material omission
necessary to make Gilead’s financial statements not misleading.23 In
other words, Gilead failed to disclose that Viread’s sales growth was
attributable largely to illegal marketing activity, thus artificially
inflating both wholesalers’ Viread inventory and Gilead share prices.
The investing public, plaintiffs argue, did not appreciate the
impact of the off-label marketing until Gilead released its
disappointing third quarter Viread sales figures on October 28,
2003, the last day of the class period.24 The market learned that
Viread sales fell significantly below third quarter projections because
wholesalers were filling prescriptions with surplus inventory rather
than reordering from Gilead at commensurate levels.25 The following
day, Gilead shares fell 12% from $59.46 to $52.00.26 Plaintiffs
explain this loss as the market’s realization of the extent to which offlabel marketing affected Viread sales, which, taken in light of the
August 7 FDA Warning Letter, amounted to a full disclosure of
Gilead’s fraud.27
B. District Court Ruling
The district court granted Gilead’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss,28 concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss
causation pursuant to the standard in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.

grow,” wholesalers filled existing orders with excessive inventory rather than purchasing
additional product from Gilead. Id. at 13 (second emphasis added).
21. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1053–54.
22. Gilead Sciences, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 14 (Aug. 14, 2003).
23. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1053.
24. Id. at 1054.
25. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 13–14.
26. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1054.
27. Id. Contra Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 14 (explaining that
Gilead, market analysts, and plaintiffs themselves in previous filings, attributed the entire drop
in Gilead’s stock price on October 29, 2003, to Gilead’s underestimation of wholesaler
overstocking and lower sales growth in Europe).
28. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2006).
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Broudo.29 The court explained that Dura requires plaintiffs to plead
proximate causation, but the complaint in this case failed to attribute
the loss in Gilead’s stock value to the alleged fraud rather than other
superseding causes.30 Specifically, the plaintiffs
[did] not connect the following chain of events . . . : 1) that
Defendants’ alleged failure to disclose the off-label marketing
scheme caused a material increase in sales; 2) that practitioners
materially decreased their demand for Viread due to the publication
of the FDA Warning Letter; and most importantly, 3) that the
alleged decrease in sales due to the FDA letter proximately caused
Gilead’s stock to decrease three months later.31

III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
The Securities Exchange Act of 193432 (“Exchange Act”) created
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and provides the
statutory basis for what courts have recognized as an implied private
right of action for securities fraud.33 Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, as amended, prohibits the “use or employ . . . [of] any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.”34 Pursuant to this section, the SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5, which makes it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at *9–10; see 544 U.S. 336, 346–47 (2005).
Gilead, 2006 WL 1320466, at *9.
Id. at *9 n.12.
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
Id.
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.35

Although neither Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act nor Rule
10b-5 expressly provides a private civil remedy for securities fraud,36
federal courts have inferred such a right since the 1940s.37 The
modern common law rule for private 10b-5 actions—aptly described
by the Court as a “judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn”38—includes the following elements:
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a
wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of
a security; (4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public
securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transactional
causation,”; (5) economic loss; and (6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.39

B. The Dura Loss Causation Pleading Standard
The Supreme Court laid out the pleading standard for loss
causation in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Brudo, a case involving
plaintiffs who alleged that they suffered damages by purchasing
securities in Dura at artificially inflated prices.40 The Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s lax pleading standard, which only required
plaintiffs to “‘establish’ . . . that ‘the price on the date of purchase was
inflated because of misrepresentation.’”41 Reasoning that
shareholders who purchase securities at an inflated price may never in
fact suffer any losses, the Court held that plaintiffs must allege both

35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (emphasis added).
36. Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975).
37. The first federal court to recognize a private civil remedy to securities fraud was the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (1946). The U.S. Supreme Court approved the
overwhelming judicial consensus in favor of the private 10b-5 action twenty-five years later in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
38. Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
39. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (internal citations
omitted).
40. Id. at 339–40.
41. Id. at 342 (internal citations omitted).
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economic loss and proximate causation to demonstrate loss causation
in the complaint.42
Though Dura identified the minimum pleading requirement for
loss causation, it did not define the intricate nuances of that
standard. Indeed, the Court held only that a plaintiff must provide a
“‘short and plain statement’ . . . provid[ing] the defendant with ‘fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests,’”43 as well as “some indication of the loss and the causal
connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”44 In line with this
standard, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving—and thus alleging—
that their economic loss was caused by the misrepresentation and not
by other confounding factors.45
C. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
Class action plaintiffs generally rely on the “fraud-on-themarket” theory (also known as the “semi-strong efficient capital
markets hypothesis,” or “efficient market theory”) to demonstrate
reliance, materiality, and loss causation in securities fraud actions.
Approving the theory’s application to demonstrate reliance in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson,46 the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he fraud on the
market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business.”47 In other words, well-developed markets
presumptively incorporate all publicly available information into
share prices. The legal application of this theory supports the
42. Id. at 346 (“[W]e find the Ninth Circuit’s approach inconsistent with the law’s
requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation (or other fraudulent
conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff’s economic loss. . . . Our holding about plaintiff’s
need to prove proximate causation and economic loss leads us also to conclude that the
plaintiffs’ complaint here failed to adequately allege these requirements.” (emphasis added)).
43. Id. at 346 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
44. Id. at 347.
45. Id. at 342–43 (“When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a
lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific
facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of
that lower price. . . . [O]ne might say that the inflated purchase price suggest that the
misrepresentation . . . ‘touches upon’ a later economic loss. But, . . . [t]o ‘touch upon’ a loss
is not to cause a loss . . . .” (emphasis added, internal citations omitted)).
46. 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988).
47. Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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presumption that anyone who purchases or sells stock within a
specified period relies on the integrity of the market price as an
accurate reflection of the stock’s value in light of all publicly available
information.48 Thus, if a company misrepresents material information
to the investing public, all investors presumptively rely on that
misrepresentation.49 Litigants also use this theory to demonstrate
materiality by showing that a particular piece of information was
significant in light of the market’s reaction to its disclosure, as well as
loss causation by showing a significant market reaction soon after the
corrective disclosure was made.50
While the Basic Court did “not intend conclusively to adopt any
particular theory of how quickly and completely . . . information is
reflected in market price,”51 the efficient market theory only makes
sense when the market reacts promptly to corrective disclosures.52
Nearly all circuit courts describe this as a “quick,”53 “rapid,”54 or
“immediate”55 process.56 If markets do not operate rationally by

48. Id. at 246–47; Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law and
Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. St.
Clare, 129 S. Ct. 1993 (2009) (No. 08-1021), 2009 WL 720917.
49. The Supreme Court adopted the “fraud on the market” theory as a practical way for
class action plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance. To require individualized proof would impose an
unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and frustrate class certification in most 10b-5 actions because
individual questions would overwhelm common question of law and fact. Basic, 485 U.S. at
242.
50. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6–7.
51. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28.
52. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6.
53. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[The]
market price responds so quickly to new information that ordinary investors cannot make
trading profits on the basis of such information.” (emphasis added)); West v. Prudential Sec.,
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
54. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“[A]n efficient market . . . ‘adjusts rapidly to reflect all new information.’” (quoting Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-theMarket Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1990))); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath,
915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An efficient market is one which rapidly reflects new
information in price.”).
55. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546
F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Evidence that unexpected corporate events or financial
releases cause an immediate response in the price of a security has been considered . . . ‘the
essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on the market theory.’” (quoting
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989))) (emphasis added); Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005) (“In an efficient market, where information
is nearly perfect, material misstatements alter a stock’s price almost immediately.”); In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[E]fficient
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quickly incorporating all publicly available information, plaintiffs
cannot look to the market’s reaction to new information to
demonstrate materiality, reliance, or loss causation. Indeed, if the
securities markets take months to incorporate new information, no
one could ever attribute market behavior to particular stimuli
because he could not credibly claim to know whether the market was
reacting to new information or progressively incorporating old
information. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Dura,
warning that “the longer the time between purchase and sale, . . .
the more likely that other factors caused the loss.”57
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the
plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint sufficiently alleged loss
causation to withstand Gilead’s motion to dismiss.58 Writing for the
unanimous panel, Judge Michael Daly Hawkins applied the standard
that “[s]o long as the complaint alleges facts that, if taken as true,
plausibly establish loss causation, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is
inappropriate.”59
A. Proximate Causation and Fact Pleading
Defining the loss causation pleading standard, the court
explained that a plaintiff “‘must demonstrate a causal connection
between the deceptive acts that form the basis for the claim of
securities fraud and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.’”60 Although
the misrepresentation need not be the “sole reason for the decline in
value of the securities, . . . it must be a ‘substantial cause.’”61 The
court declined to rule whether Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to the loss causation pleading

markets are those in which information important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately
incorporated into stock prices.”) (internal citations omitted).
56. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 6–7.
57. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (emphasis added).
58. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
59. Id. at 1057 (“This is not ‘a probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of loss causation.’”
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))).
60. Id. at 1055 (quoting In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005)).
61. Id. at 1055–56 (emphasis added) (quoting Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d
1441, 1447 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997)).
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standard, holding simply that the complaint must provide “‘sufficient
detail to give defendants ample notice of [plaintiff’s] loss causation
theory, and to give us some assurance that the theory has a basis in
fact.’”62
The Ninth Circuit chastised the district court for its
“incredulity,” explaining that loss causation is more appropriately a
matter of proof at trial and should not to be decided on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, unless the plaintiff fails to allege facts
that “plausibly establish loss causation.”63 Specifically, the court took
issue with the district court’s unwillingness to accept (1) “‘the . . .
inference that a public revelation on August 8 caused a price drop
three months later on October 28,’” and (2) the court’s finding that a
“‘slowing increase in demand, alone, [is] too speculative to
adequately demonstrate loss causation.’”64
Regarding the latter of these issues, the Ninth Circuit found that
a “slowing increase in demand” was not too speculative to
adequately demonstrate loss causation because, as the plaintiffs
allege, “physicians were less eager to prescribe Viread,” and
competitors used the FDA Warning Letter to discourage Gilead
prescriptions.65 This provided enough factual support to raise a
“reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the
FDA Warning Letter’s effect on Viread demand.66 Finding that
plaintiffs’ theories were “not facially implausible,” the court advised
the district court to reserve its skepticism for later stages of the
proceedings.67 “A well-pleaded complaint,” Judge Hawkins
concluded, “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote
and unlikely.”68

62. Id. at 1056 (emphasis added) (quoting Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527
F.3d 982, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2008)).
63. Id. at 1057 (citing In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. May 12, 2006)).
64. Id. (quoting In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *7, 7 n.10 (N.D.
Cal. May 12, 2006)).
65. Id. at 1058.
66. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
67. Id. at 1057.
68. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).
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B. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and Loss Causation Timing

Turning to the district court’s concern over the three month
delay between the off-label marketing disclosure on August 8 and
the drop in Gilead’s stock price on October 28, the Ninth Circuit
“rejected a ‘bright-line rule requiring an immediate market reaction’
because ‘[t]he market is subject to distortions that prevent the ideal
of a free and open public market from occurring.’”69 Instead, courts
must engage in a “fact-specific inquiry” to determine the functional
efficiency of a particular market.70
As applied to this case, the Ninth Circuit’s America West
standard purportedly provides that a “limited temporal gap” of even
three months between the date Gilead’s off-labeling marketing was
publicly revealed and the subsequent drop in share prices “does not
render [the] plaintiff[s’] theory of loss causation per se implausible.”71
The court reasoned that because the market was not aware that offlabel marketing was the “cornerstone” of Viread sales,72 and the drop
in share prices occurred immediately after Gilead disclosed
disappointing third quarter revenues—purportedly caused by
declining end-user demand73—the market did not comprehend the
full extent of Gilead’s fraud until October 28, 2003. Plaintiffs allege,
moreover, that the purportedly lower end-user demand was caused
by the FDA Warning Letter in August.74 Thus, physicians reasonably
could have responded to the FDA Warning Letter by prescribing
alternative medications while the investing public failed to appreciate
the letter’s significance.75
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that the complaint
sufficiently alleged “a causal relationship between (1) the increase in
sales resulting from the off-label marketing, (2) the Warning Letter’s
effect on Viread orders, and (3) the Warning Letter’s effect on
Gilead’s stock price.”76

69. Id. at 1057–58 (quoting No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust
Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003)).
70. Id. at 1058 (quoting Am. W. Holding, 320 F.3d at 934).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 1056.
73. Id. at 1058. Contra text accompanying note 20.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1057.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gilead is problematic for two
reasons: first, the plaintiffs’ theory is not “plausible” because it is
inconsistent with prevailing securities law, or more specifically, it
undermines the fraud-on-the-market theory upon which plaintiffs’
very claims hinge. Additionally, the court did not require plaintiffs to
show proximate causation by alleging facts that would allow the
court to ascribe some rough proportion of the whole loss to the
alleged fraud rather than other confounding factors. Although the
court’s general loss causation standard—that plaintiffs must “allege[]
facts that, if taken as true, plausibly establish loss causation”77—does
not facially contradict Dura, the court did not rigorously apply its
own pleading standards to the facts at hand in Gilead. More
importantly, the Ninth Circuit set an impermissibly lax loss causation
pleading bar by overlooking Congress’s objectives in contemporary
securities litigation reforms.
A. Policies Underlying Modern Securities Regulation
The pleading standard for loss causation in a Rule 10b-5 action
must be informed by the competing policies underlying securities
regulation: to maintain public confidence in the securities markets by
deterring fraud and compensating aggrieved shareholders,78 while
also tempering antifraud measures to prevent vexatious litigation.79
Congress has recognized that “[p]rivate securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
losses,” and that private lawsuits “promote public and global
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and
77. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
78. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (citing Randall v.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986)) (reasoning that securities markets seek to maintain
public confidence “by deterring fraud, in part, through the availability of private securities
litigation”); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (“[T]he 1934 Act and its companion
legislative enactments embrace a ‘fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.’” (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963))).
79. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
739 (1975) (“There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents
a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies
litigation in general.”).
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guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and
others properly perform their jobs.”80 The Supreme Court has thus
emphasized that pleading standards must “preserv[e] investors’
ability to recover on meritorious claims.”81
Notwithstanding this need, Congress and the Supreme Court
have pruned back the 10b-5 “judicial oak” to protect defendants
from frivolous litigation.82 The Blue Chips Stamps Court warned that
10b-5 securities claims are uniquely vulnerable to vexatiousness
because they offer a high settlement value to plaintiffs.83 These cases
typically involve a significant and costly amount of discovery
requiring extensive deposition of corporate officers and associates
and the concomitant opportunity for extensive discovery of
corporate documents.84 Securities fraud suits can also frustrate
normal business activity of the defendant—which is completely
unrelated to the lawsuit—and damage corporate goodwill.85 In
addition, because 10b-5 actions often turn on the credibility of
competing testimony, many cases are difficult to dispose of prior to
trial other than by settlement.86 Thus, even an objectively weak claim
has a settlement value to the plaintiff—in light of the many burdens
borne by the defendant—so long as he prevents the suit from being
resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.87
To curb this threat, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),88 which requires
plaintiffs to prove, inter alia, “that the act or omission of the
defendant . . . caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages.”89 The Supreme Court in Dura made clear that loss
80. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80–81 (2006).
81. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“Our task
is to prescribe a workable . . . standard . . . geared to the PSLRA's twin goals: to curb frivolous,
lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims.”).
82. Congress explicitly passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to
provide “protections to discourage frivolous litigation.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-469, 32
(1995).
83. Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975); see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80–81 (2006).
84. Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740–41.
85. Id. at 740.
86. Id. at 742.
87. Id. at 740.
88. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (emphasis added).
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causation must not only be proven at trial, but alleged in the
plaintiff’s complaint.90 To require anything less, the unanimous
Court reasoned, “would bring about harm of the very sort the
statutes seek to avoid.”91
Echoing the warning in Blue Chips Stamps, the Dura Court
emphasized that a relaxed pleading standard would allow plaintiffs
with “largely groundless claim[s] to simply take up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant
evidence.”92 The PSLRA and other judicially-wrought standards thus
forge a reasonable pleading bar against “nuisance filings, targeting of
deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and
manipulation by class action lawyers.”93 These limits recognize that
anti-fraud regulations do not provide investors with “broad
insurance against market losses,” but rather protect them against the
economic losses that misrepresentations and omissions actually
cause.94
B. Fraud-on-the-Market and “Plausibility”
The Ninth Circuit requires 10b-5 plaintiffs to allege “facts that,
if taken as true, plausibly establish loss causation.”95 This standard is
facially consistent with other circuits, which generally require
plaintiffs to plead factual allegations that provide a reasonable, nonspeculative basis to believe that plaintiffs can ultimately prove the

90. Dura Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (“Our holding about plaintiffs’
need to prove proximate causation and economic loss leads us also to conclude that the
plaintiffs’ complaint . . . [must] allege these requirements.”).
91. Id. at 347 (“[A]llowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic
loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about harm of the very sort
the statutes seek to avoid.”).
92. Id. (quoting Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
93. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007) (“Setting a
uniform pleading standard for § 10(b) actions was among Congress’ objectives when it enacted
the PSLRA. Designed to curb perceived abuses of the § 10(b) private action—‘nuisance filings,
targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by class
action lawyers,’— . . . the PSLRA installed both substantive and procedural controls.” (internal
citations omitted)).
94. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988)).
95. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (emphasis added).
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elements of causation at trial.96 The Ninth Circuit’s application,
however, diverges from the prevailing standard. In evaluating the
Gilead plaintiffs’ allegations, the court required only that the theory
not be “facially implausible.”97 Indeed, the court allowed plaintiffs’
complaint to proceed beyond 12(b)(6) dismissal without any proof
that the alleged misrepresentation caused the loss rather than other
confounding factors, and relied upon a causation theory that facially
contradicted legal principles underlying the plaintiffs’ claim.98 The
Ninth Circuit’s understanding of “plausibility” is thus impermissibly
lax.
Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a plausible proximate link
between the alleged fraud and the economic loss ensures that only
reasonably well founded claims proceed to discovery pursuant to the
policy objectives articulated in the PSLRA and the Court’s 10b-5
jurisprudence.99 “Plausible” means that the plaintiff’s theory of
causation is generally sound and logically consistent with prevailing
securities law, not that the plaintiff will actually be able to prove the
facts supporting his theory.100 This standard provides a critical
procedural hurdle against frivolous litigation, ensuring that discovery
is not used as a fishing expedition to uncover facts necessary to piece
together a plausible case theory.101
96. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 4. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits
apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to securities fraud claims, which requires allegations
to be pled with “particularity.” See Catogas v. Cyberonics, Inc., 292 F. App’x 311, 312–14
(5th Cir. 2008); Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824,
839 n.10, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2007). The Second, Fourth, and Eight Circuits, while not
applying Rule 9(b), still require “sufficient factual information to provide the ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Schaaf v.
Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 222 (2008); see also Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 158 (2d
Cir. 2007); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 186 (4th Cir. 2007).
97. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057.
98. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 4.
99. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (“The [PSLRA] . . .
makes clear Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery only where
plaintiffs adequately allege . . . the traditional elements of causation and loss.”).
100. The Ninth Circuit seemed to blur the distinction between evaluating plaintiffs’
causal theory and the likelihood that plaintiffs could actually prove the facts underlying that
theory, suggesting that both should be reserved “for later stages of the proceedings” rather
than 12(b)(6) dismissal. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057.
101. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (lamenting “abusive” litigation
tactics, including “the routine filing of lawsuits . . . with only [a] faint hope that the discovery
process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action”); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740–42 (1975).
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The Ninth Circuit’s criticism of the district court in Gilead was
misguided because the district court found that plaintiffs’ theory of
causation was implausible, not that plaintiffs could not prove the
facts supporting that theory.102 Indeed, the plaintiffs’ theory facially
contradicts “fraud-on-the-market” principles explicitly adopted in
Basic and presumed by Congress in the Securities Acts.103 In their
complaint, plaintiffs allege that although the SEC issued a public
corrective disclosure revealing Gilead’s off-label marketing activity—
the alleged fraud—on August 7, 2003, the market did not
comprehend the magnitude of this fraud until after a “limited
temporal gap” of nearly three months when Gilead issued its thirdquarter financial results on October 28, 2003. Yet, plaintiffs
simultaneously allege that drug wholesalers and doctors understood
the implications of the SEC’s off-label marketing letter and scaled
back purchases and prescriptions, respectively.104 In other words,
although medical professionals and wholesalers understood the
implications of the FDA Warning Letter, its significance,
inexplicably, never dawned upon market analysts, investment
bankers, individual investors, and other market participants.
This simply does not comport with the fraud-on-the-market
theory. Basic instructed that the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption
is built upon the idea that well-developed markets efficiently
incorporate all publicly available information into share prices.105
Moreover, legal application of this theory necessarily presumes that
markets incorporate public information quickly.106 If markets do not
comprehend and efficiently incorporate public information, the
Gilead plaintiffs cannot credibly rely on the market price as an
accurate representation of share value based on all public
information, nor can they use the market’s reaction to new
information to demonstrate materiality or loss causation.
Although the Ninth Circuit explained that securities markets are
subject to “distortions,” and courts must therefore engage in “factspecific inquiry,” the court curiously omitted any discussion of how a
reasonable investor could fail to comprehend the magnitude of the
August 7 Warning Letter, and, more importantly, how the October
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 9–11.
Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1053, 1058.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
See supra text accompanying notes 51–57.
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28 earnings disclosure revealed anything new other than declining
Viread sales. The October 28 disclosure did not explain the extent of
Gilead’s off-label marketing activity, nor did it attribute the declining
sales to the FDA Warning Letter. Indeed, many analysts attributed
the decline in Viread sales to wholesalers’ excessive buildup during
the second quarter in anticipation of Viread’s price increase rather
than to declining end-user demand, which may have actually grown
during the third quarter.107
Instead, the market may have sensibly discounted the FDA
Warning Letter in light of other factors.108 In any event, because the
October 28 disclosure did not reveal anything new that the market
could not apprehend from the August 7 disclosure, the plaintiff’s
theory of causation is facially implausible. The Ninth Circuit’s
holding that an “efficient” market can take three months to
incorporate public information into share prices is also inconsistent
with the prevailing understanding of the fraud-on-the-market
theory.109
C. Pleading Proximate Causation
The most glaring problem with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is
the court’s disregard for the Dura proximate causation pleading
standard, which follows from Dura’s admonition that a plaintiff
cannot ignore superseding contributory causes when pleading loss
causation.110 A plaintiff’s causal theory will unravel if his loss can be
explained more accurately as a product of changed economic
circumstances,
investor
expectations,
or
industry-specific
conditions.111 Thus, a plaintiff must allege facts that allow the court
107. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 13–14 (explaining that Viread enduser demand actually grew by up to 17% during the third quarter).
108. At least one of the off-label applications advertised by Gilead has since been
approved by the FDA. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approves Viread(R) for Chronic
Hepatitis B in Adults, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.
medicalnewstoday.com/articles/117958.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2010) (announcing the
FDA’s approval of Viread for hepatitis B patients). In addition, Gilead’s annual revenue has
grown by more than 600% in six years, from $868 million in 2003 to more than $5.3 billion in
2008. See Gilead Sciences, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Feb. 27, 2009). Thus, in
light of Gilead’s long-term growth potential and Viread’s expanding medical applications, the
market could have consciously discounted the significance of the FDA Warning Letter in
August of 2003.
109. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 48, at 9–11.
110. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
111. Id.
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to ascribe some rough proportion of the whole loss to the alleged
fraud rather than other superseding factors. The Dura Court further
explained that, all things being equal, the longer the time between
the purchase and sale of the security, the more likely other factors
caused the loss.112
While a plaintiff must prove that the alleged fraud was a
“substantial cause” of the loss to recover damages at trial, the
pleading standard only requires him to establish a reasonably wellfounded basis for believing that he will be able to prove substantial
causation at trial.113 This is a practical standard that bars largely
groundless claims with only a faint hope that discovery will reveal
some plausible course of action,114 while preserving for trial plausible
claims with a “reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process
will reveal relevant evidence”115 necessary to substantiate the finer
elements of proportional causation.
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized this principle in Gilead—
explaining that while a misrepresentation need not be the “sole
reason for the decline in value of the securities . . . it must be a
substantial cause”116—the Gilead opinion lacks any discussion of
proximate causation, “substantial cause,” or alleged facts that could
allow the court to ascribe some rough proportion of the total loss to
Gilead’s off-label marketing. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit rebuked the
district court’s so-called “incredulity” for rejecting the plaintiffs’
deficient theory of causation, explaining that plaintiffs’ complaint
need only offer “sufficient detail to . . . give [the court] some
assurance that theory has a basis in fact.”117
Yet, the court also failed to identify any facts in the complaint
providing assurance that plaintiffs’ loss causation theory has a basis in
fact. Significantly, market analysts’ explanations of the drop in
Gilead’s stock prices contradict that of the plaintiffs. Many analysts
attributed the decline to excessive wholesaler buildup and declining
sales growth in Europe. End-user demand for Viread actually grew

112. Id.
113. See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2008).
114. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (lamenting “abusive” litigation
tactics, including “the routine filing of lawsuits . . . with only [a] faint hope that the discovery
process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action”).
115. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.
116. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1055–56 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 1056 (internal quotations omitted).
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during the third quarter. Moreover, even if plaintiffs demonstrated
that the decline in Viread sales growth was somehow linked to the
FDA Warning Letter, they still would not demonstrate a causal
connection with the stock price decline three months later in
October. As even the Dura Court warned, the longer the time
between public disclosure of the alleged fraud and the drop in share
prices, the less likely the fraud caused the loss.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit has introduced in Gilead Sciences a highly
permissive pleading standard that allows complaints to proceed
beyond Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal so long as the theory of causation is
not “facially implausible,” regardless of whether plaintiffs allege facts
demonstrating proximate causation. The court also construes the
word “plausible” to include theories of causation manifestly
inconsistent with the fraud-on-the-market theory—a principle
underlying virtually all securities litigation claims. This standard
betrays the statutory and common law limitations on private
securities litigation designed to bar highly speculative or implausible
complaints. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of loss
causation permits any plaintiff class that has lost share value to search
retrospectively for a potential cause, plead a logically inconsistent and
factually unsubstantiated causal link, and proceed beyond the critical
dismissal stage to discovery.118 This effectively transforms the private
securities claim into an insurance policy against market losses.119
Though the Gilead Sciences court would leave evaluation of a
plaintiff’s loss causation theory to the latter stages of litigation,120
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized that frivolous
litigation must be stopped before the costly discovery process

118. The Gilead plaintiffs plead three different theories of causation before prevailing on
appeal with their Fourth Amended Complaint. The first and most plausible theory alleged that
Gilead’s material misstatement was understating the extent of wholesalers’ stockpiling during the
second quarter. This was subsequently verified in the October disclosure. In re Gilead Scis. Sec.
Litig., 2006 WL 1320466, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2006).
119. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 345 (“[T]he statutes make [private securities fraud] actions
available, not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect
them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”).
120. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057 (“[Other circuits have] held that loss causation ‘is a
matter of proof at trial and not to be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’ . . . We
agree.” (emphasis added)).
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begins.121 Even unmeritorious complaints that survive dismissal offer
an enormous settlement value to defendants.122 Thus, as the only
gatekeepers against in terrorem securities suits, federal courts must
employ Rule 12(b)(6) with a more rigorous standard than that
offered by the Ninth Circuit.
Brandon J. Stoker

121. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, (1995) (Conf. Rep.); Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; see
also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (When the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, “‘this basic deficiency
should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties
and the court.’” (emphasis added)).
122. See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
 J.D. candidate, April, 2010 J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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